ABSTRACT: Contemporary deliberation depends on an infrastructure of expertise the way travel depends on transportation infrastructure. Like other forms of infrastructure, the inner workings of expertise become less visible to its users, even as expertise itself becomes more indispensable. Accountability is an essential design requirement for any such system.
INTRODUCTION
Argumentation is among the most powerful tools humanity has for building societies and solving problems. Argument stimulates deeper thought, motivates the search for more information, and at least in some cases produces alignment of belief. We learn through argumentation, both as individuals and societies. We also learn about argumentation, and as we learn about it, we change it profoundly. Argumentation in our day is technical not just in the content of some propositions or the qualifications of some participants but in the argument techniques that have evolved over millennia of practice.
Among the most visible of the evolutionary directions of argumentation are the increasingly disciplined bases for opinion-formation and the increasingly complex designs we have for incorporating disciplined opinion into decision making. This conference weighs one of those trends a bit more heavily than the other: focusing more on the growing dependence of citizens on experts than on the growing dependence of expertise itself on layers of technical achievements. However, both trends are important and need theoretical attention, and they are intimately interconnected. I am particularly pleased to be part of a conference that draws together such diverse disciplinary perspectives, because understanding the role of expertise in contemporary society is going to require all the disciplines with a piece of the problem to share their insights.
Despite disciplinary differences in which questions interest us most, what we all share as citizens is a need to make the best possible use of expertise, while reserving the possibility of holding experts accountable for their overall beneficence. Surveying the diversity of research topics at this conference suggests to me that it may be time to attempt a clean break from a notion that has had a powerful hold on rhetoric for centuries: the idea that appeal to authority is a class of arguments, some members of which are fallacious while others are sound. Contemporary argumentation studies inherited this notion, and it continues to drive a 2 search for a standard set of tests of acceptability of appeals to authority that can be applied within the natural limits of a critical discussion-for example, lists of critical questions that can be asked about an argument (Walton, 1989) . Plenty of clear cases of argument from authority can be found, but so can plenty of cases where the same epistemic problems are expressed quite differently. Many contemporary practices involving dependence on expertise resist assimilation to the concept of an argument from authority or an appeal to expertise and are not illuminated by the critical questions approach. For example, there are system-level issues to consider, such as the overall quality of the information environment (at this conference, Shanahan and others) and its lack of aids to citizen judgment (at this conference, Anelli; Kloster; and others); institution-level issues, such as management of known sources of bias in deliberative inquiry (at this conference, Rehg; Snoeck-Henkemans & Wagemans; and others), and individual-level issues having to do with citizens' capacity to judge information (at this conference, Pigliucci; Tachino & Russell; Weinel; and others) and with experts' own attitudes toward their expertise (at this conference: Blair; Zenker; and others).
So let's start with what any of us can see when we look around for expertise in play within variously scaled disagreement spaces. Unless we have already decided to restrict our attention to a certain class of arguments, the phenomena we see are quite heterogeneous. Consider an initial set of prototypes that will be familiar to everyone as settings where expertise is or may become a significant part of a disagreement space.
Prototype 1. Individual people purposefully searching for answers to questions, not knowing at first whether there are any experts in the subject. What they want is knowledge to guide their own actions and beliefs-not specifically an expert to trust. But questions about the expert basis for knowledge and about which experts may be trusted often come up when multiple sources have been found, and when the information sources do not all agree on the answer to the question. Most of us probably share the experience of searching the worldwide web for information on health either for ourselves or for family members. Some of us probably have family members who cherry-pick from among experts those whose advice happens to justify what they want to do and then appeal to these at need. In contemporary discourse, there is ample material that can be analyzed in terms of appeal to expert authority and ample opportunity to improve information literacy through critical questioning (from this conference, see McAfee; Nucci; and others).
Prototype 2. Individual people projecting their expertise, either because public information is their business or because they are hoping to build prestige, accumulate social capital, or attract jobs. Projection of expertise has become a small industry, supported by professional networking applications like LinkedIn and by more ambitious projects for mapping scientific expertise like Cornell's VIVO project (see http://vivo.cornell.edu/). The growth of interest in professional networking suggests that the problem ordinary citizens face in choosing among experts is mirrored by the problem experts face in positioning themselves to be the ones chosen from among all possible sources of advice (see especially Tindale, this conference).
Prototype 3. Individual experts responding to questions of public interest. This pattern occurs daily in countless news stories, and it is well known that journalists choose sources for reasons that have little to do with actual expertise. Journalists often have favorite quotemeisters, and in the search for balanced coverage of controversies, they may select for diversity of opinion rather than for presenting the public with a good basis for forming its own opinions.
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Prototype 4. Panels of experts chartered to respond to requests for advice on specific points. Typically, this occurs as part of a larger deliberative process, with a subset of contested issues delegated to the experts while use of the answers is left to other participants such as policy makers or the public. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change is a theoretically and practically significant example (Rehg, 2011 , and related remarks at this conference), but lower profile efforts of the same kind have become common in policy formation and have given rise to a new form of expertise in design of policy deliberation (Carcasson, this conference).
Prototype 5. Expert bureaucracies that actually make decisions and carry out actions. I have in mind here the myriad agencies that develop and enforce various standards, like the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, but also the many entities that make decisions about how to allocate research funds among possible research topics, like the National Science Foundation and the National Institutes of Health (NIH). For situations of this type, knowing who is and is not an expert is nowhere near sufficient to safeguard public interest. People who know what they are talking about may still overvalue their own interests over others' interests, and people who have few checks on their behavior can take unfair advantage of that fact. The public has little to no say, for example, in how NIH allocates public funds among all of the diseases it might choose for funding.
I have arranged these prototypes along a continuum from the most ad hoc to the most institutionalized. All are important to understanding the role of expertise in what we believe and what we do. And to some extent, as we move up this ladder, the more institutional forms incorporate aspects of the ad hoc forms. For example, expert bureaucracies must have a steady supply of experts to perform specific judgmental tasks, including evaluation of the work of other experts. My own interest is increasingly focused on the more institutionalized end of this continuum, where questions about which individual experts to trust become less interesting and questions about institutional design become more interesting.
Notice that different disciplines involved in this conference have different strengths and weaknesses in dealing with the facets of the problem. Contemporary argumentation theory, especially pragma-dialectics, has greatly improved our understanding of how otherwise reasonable argument schemes may generate fallacious moves in discourse (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992; Snoeck-Henkemans & Wagemans, this conference) . Normative pragmatics adds theorizing about the obligations inherent in different speech acts (Goodwin, 2011 and this conference; Kauffeld, this conference) . Informal logic suggests new ways of thinking about argument soundness (Johnson & Blair, 1994; Walton, 1989 Walton, , 2008  represented at this conference by Blair; Tindale; and others). New directions in science studies offer powerful new concepts for thinking about varieties of expertise and about the meta-expertises required for how we live now (Collins & Evans, 2007; Collins & Weinel, 2011; Weinel, this conference) . Other perspectives from communication, sociology, political science, and philosophy, too numerous and heterogeneous to cite, help us to understand institutions that emerge from practice and direct our attention to the integrity of our institutions and the problem-validity of their designs for making scientific knowledge actionable.
To the mix of perspectives that are already familiar in scholarship on expertise and expert-based arguments I will also add perspectives from design theory and from a newer line of work known as infrastructure studies. No amount of scientific literacy among the citizenry can eliminate the need for designing participation formats, so design theory is needed to guide how society takes advantage of expert knowledge. And particularly for the expressions of expert dependence that move up the ladder toward institutionalization, it may be helpful for us to think of certain products and practices as infrastructural.
ARGUMENTATION DESIGN THEORY
To address argumentation as it now occurs rather than as it once occurred requires that we acknowledge the role of design-and acknowledge as well the fact that design has changed the practice of argumentation over time. Argumentation design theory is not one cohesive strand of work but a set of design concepts and design practices that are implicit in many distinct strands of work. Design themes have been central to my own work, much of which has been done in collaboration with Scott Jacobs.
Jacobs' and my work is grounded in the natural design of conversational argument (Jackson & Jacobs, 1980; Jacobs & Jackson, 1989 , and it recognizes a blurry and reflexive distinction between natural and built environments for argumentation (Jackson, 1998 (Jackson, , 2008 Jackson & Jacobs, 2006) . Most of our studies have been qualitative empirical discourse analyses, but with a strong theme around attempting to theorize design. I have proposed an explicit design methodology that could provide a framework for a version of translational work in our field (Jackson, 1998) .
The natural design of argumentation in conversation is expansion around disagreement. In the normal course of conversation, argument starts with the participants becoming aware that they have a disagreement that makes some sort of difference to one or the other of them. Instead of moving forward with the business at hand, the participants reorganize their efforts around exploring and repairing the disagreement. They do this with varying levels of skill and with varying degrees of emotion.
Jackson and Jacobs have advanced three key propositions concerning the natural design of argumentation.
First, argumentation is about drilling down from disagreements, not building up from agreements. People do begin interactions with considerable bodies of common belief, but they do not and cannot enumerate these as the foundations from which to reach further agreements. Instead, people assume alignment until actions give evidence of misalignment.
Second, unless the misalignment is of no significance to anyone, it expands a speech act exchange by routing conversation into an attempt at repair. In ordinary conversation, the resolution process is commonly just more conversation. If the misalignment can be repaired, the conversation can return to its main business.
Third, sometimes, no resolution is possible within the natural limits of the conversation, and each new expansion simply exposes new disagreement space. Any conversational move provides some set of opportunities for disagreement, including not only what is actually asserted but also any belief or commitment the speaker reveals without actually stating it. Appeals to expert authority do not typically appear without context; they appear, as most argument content does, through challenge and response.
Argument expands around points of disagreement that the participants themselves choose from a constantly reshaping disagreement space. Sometimes participants accept standpoints simply because their co-participants have expressed commitment to these standpoints; other times they question the standpoint, but accept the thinnest possible backing; and other times, they attempt more extensive inquiry. Some have interpreted Grice's (1989) Cooperative Principle as implying that without this willingness to accept a great deal of content simply on one another's say-so, conversation would be impossible.
So far I have been reviewing what we know about the natural design of argumentation and have said nothing about the problems presented by appeals to technical expertise. An appeal to expert authority occurring in ordinary conversation may look very much like the pattern familiar from informal logic texts: challenged for the basis for some exposed belief, a person may point to any form of support, including support from outside sources of all kinds. Sometimes the fact that authority can be cited for a standpoint is sufficient to end a line of argument. If not, asking critical questions about whether the outside source is truly authoritative is just one way to expand further. Another obvious way to expand the disagreement is for the challenger to demand to know how the outside source came to its conclusion, and yet another is to insist on referring the disagreement to someone outside the discussion itself. When we think about argument as a process of drilling down from disagreements, it is the challenger who must make some strategic calculation about how the discussion proceeds: whether to accept the authority's standpoint, or to challenge the credentials of that authority, or to introduce a competing authority, or to explore the expert basis for the authority's standpoint, or even to literally outsource the decision. These are various ways the sequence can unfold, not fundamentally different ways of reaching conclusions (and as Zenker pointed out at this conference, the challenger's choice among these alternatives may be based on calculation of which offers the greatest strategic advantage).
I want to extend these key propositions with a fourth: there is no limit in principle to how deep participants can go in drilling down from disagreement. But there are limits in practice, and participants sometimes find that it is simply not feasible to continue with ever more fundamental objections. And moreover, sometimes we make judgments about how likely it is that drilling down further will produce anything useful. This characteristic of natural argument is inherited by technical argumentation and by argumentation among experts themselves.
My task now is to show how these key findings about the natural design of argumentation might help us in thinking about technical argumentation and its role in practical affairs of citizens. In the US, we have an ongoing controversy over how schools should educate young teenagers about sex. Ideologically based, the main division of opinion is between those who believe that young people should be taught to abstain from sex until marriage and those who believe that young people should be taught to practice safer sex throughout their lives. This is a very complex controversy, one that has played out between parents and school officials in countless school districts as well as between politicians and public health agencies. A large empirical research literature has built around this controversy, and it is available for invocation by participants. Figure 1 presents a partial concept map of some of the issues in the controversy as it had developed by late 2007. This is not an argument diagram but an abstraction from many individual arguments to a set of themes that connect to one another in various ways, such as support versus opposition. Whether any of these particular themes appear in any text or in any bounded discussion of sex education depends on what opinions participants have going in to the discussion and how they choose to expand from any disagreements that appear. The materials that are available for invocation from participants include artifacts remaining from earlier contributions. In the lower right hand corner my concept map shows just one of many such artifacts: a research report published in BMJ and widely covered in the popular press 6 ( Underhill, Montgomery, & Operario, 2007) . Most citizens who encountered this artifact saw it mentioned in the news, in stories announcing that abstinence-only sex education does not work, or in quasi-official websites with information on sex education programs.
In my own prior analysis of this controversy (Jackson, 2008) , I suggested that expert arguments enter public debate as "black boxes" that are not really open to expansion without assistance of experts. In actor-network theory (from which I have borrowed this concept), a black box is a stabilized practice that has ceased to require explanation and defence within an expert community (Latour, 1987 ). An ordinary educated citizen can make a few inroads into evaluating the contents of the box, but to go very far the explorer will have to actually build expertise. Sooner or later, without specialty expertise, argument drills down to something that must be taken on expert authority. Consider the plight of the intrepid school board member who wants to understand how scientists could possibly conclude that abstinence education does not work-for it is the citizen who disagrees with this conclusion who is most likely to want to find its flaws. This intrepid soul can find the Underhill et al. (2007) article without much difficulty, since it has been mentioned in the news. With only the ubiquitous expertise of a literate adult, the citizen can identify a first level of backing for the conclusion: something like Figure 2 abstinence-only sex education to "usual care" (whatever curriculum the school district had in place prior to introduction of a curriculum designed to teach abstinence from sex outside of marriage).
Fig. 2. Summary of evidence from Underhill et al. (2007).
Anyone who is not too easily discouraged can see that the study-by-study evidence divides unevenly between results that show abstinence programs more effective than the comparison and results that show abstinence programs less effective. More expertise is needed to avoid faulty reasoning at this level: sociological discrimination is required to understand that this pattern of findings is, overall, strong evidence against the success of abstinence programs judged against the outcomes measured in the studies, and that it is not evidence of scientific controversy (Weinel, this conference). Additional skeptical questions can be asked at this level. One might suspect, for example, that the authors of the study selected evidence in a biased way to support their own preferred conclusion; but to make any reasonable judgment about this question the individual must understand not only systematic review but also certain standard criteria scientists use to judge experimental design. If the individual is satisfied that the authors selected studies in an unbiased way and that the evident heterogeneity in the body of studies can still yield a consistent picture, a next recourse is to consider whether the individual studies 8 have been fairly and correctly categorized, and this requires still more expertise, most particularly in statistics. Few citizens who are not themselves social scientists could get this far, but for those who reach this point and find nothing to object to, there are still avenues for critique. For example, before giving up entirely on the idea of abstinence education, one might want to examine the actual curriculum materials used in the individual studies to make qualitative judgments based on knowledge of child psychology, instructional design, or persuasive message design, all of which are themselves expert fields.
Among our natural argumentation competencies are some that allow us to invent improvements that extend these competencies, and these extended competencies become naturalized competencies for new members of a discourse community. Black boxes assemble these inventions into repeatable patterns of argumentation within expert communities. Black boxes develop through long experience within a substantive domain, and they become stable features of expert practice when experts themselves come to regard them as the usual way to draw a conclusion. Scientists appropriate these practices from other fields and build new practices of their own on top of the prior practice. So in the case of research on sex education, for example, methods for judging the effectiveness of educational programs are built on a preexisting set of procedures for measuring outcomes and comparing them statistically. Methods for systematically reviewing literatures are built over methods for generating large numbers of studies that answer variations on a single central question.
For citizens, this means that expert knowledge introduced into practical discussion or policy making is likely to have its actual substantive basis in a very large number of very different expert fields. Any effort to engage substantively involves digging down through layers of expertise. And at each layer, much of the substantive basis for conclusions has been left implicit because expert practice at that level has long since been black-boxed.
How should we think about these layers of specialty knowledge? Set aside the question of whether to trust individual scientists. Can we really trust knowledge claims that come wrapped in layers and layers of prior decisions about how to draw conclusions? Every one of those layers involves some substantive content, but also some historical decision by one person or group to accept a way of doing things based on the expert guidance of some other person or group, and these historical decisions introduce path-dependence into a current array of decisions.
Although concepts and methods familiar in argumentation studies have much to contribute within layers, and something to contribute between layers, I suggest that theorizing about layering as a characteristic of contemporary argumentation practice requires some new concepts and methods. It is this notion that leads me to suggest that we look to infrastructure studies for ideas about how to theorize our heavily layered practices and about how to design better interfaces between one layer and another.
INFRASTRUCTURE THEORY
Does it make sense to talk about expert organizations and institutions as infrastructure for decision making? I think it does. At first, it may be very difficult to see where I am heading in this discussion of infrastructure theory. It will help to remember that I am arguing that argumentation itself has evolved many technical systems with device-like components. And it may also help if I say up front that the natural competence we all have for arguing is connected to these technical systems in the same way that people's natural ability to walk is connected to technical systems that aid in transportation and the way people's natural ability to talk is connected to technical systems for telecommunication. Technical systems do not usually replace natural competencies, but they do often change our options for how to do things.
The formal study of infrastructure is very new. The concept itself is really a twentiethcentury concept, and scholarly interest in infrastructure has been rising since about the 1980s, with studies of large technical systems. Much of the work in infrastructure studies involves analysis of the evolution of particular systems, such as emergence of the power distribution infrastructure (Hughes, 1983) . Lately, though, general theory has been emerging of what it is to be infrastructural, and it is also increasingly understood that skills and competencies can be infrastructural (Bietz, Baumer, & Lee, 2010 ).
An increasingly standard account of what makes a technical system infrastructural is that offered by Star and Ruhleder (1996) , based on the observation that infrastructure is not a category of technical systems but a kind of relationship between a technical system and the work it supports. Systems are infrastructure for particular users or uses when they are embedded in ("sunk into") some practice, when they operate transparently and unproblematically, when they have extension in time and space beyond any one occasion of use, and when their use is "naturalized" in the learning of a practice built over them. They depend on standards (so as to interoperate with other systems), are built on the installed base of other and earlier infrastructure, and become visible when they "break."
Technical systems that become infrastructural for a set of users are those that can be taken for granted, incorporated as layers beneath other technical systems. The more infrastructural they become, the less visible they become to the user. Highway systems and electricity distribution systems are infrastructural for contemporary, developed economies, allowing individuals and communities to build other services that take these systems for granted.
As Edwards, Bowker, Jackson, and Williams (2009) point out, infrastructures cannot just be designed and built; they must grow, becoming infrastructural not as a matter of prior engineering but as a matter of incorporation into work. For a technical system, becoming infrastructure is an achievement that occurs slowly over time if it occurs at all (S. J. Jackson, Edwards, Bowker, & Knobel, 2007) . Not all efforts to build infrastructure have been successful. Some have simply failed to attract users (Star & Ruhleder, 1996) and others have failed to achieve "can't-do-withoutness" (Edwards et al., 2009) .
Technical systems are infrastructural for people who take them for granted and construct other activities that assume the technical capabilities as facts about the environment. A technical system may be considered infrastructure when its capabilities have been embedded so deeply in work that the work cannot continue if the technical capability fails, and especially when learning to do the work includes learning to rely on the technical system as though it were a natural fact.
A key insight of Star and Ruhleder (1996; also Bowker, Baker, Millerand, & Ribes, 2010 , and others working in infrastructure studies) is that infrastructure must be understood relationally. A system is not born infrastructural; that status is earned slowly, as people take advantage of a system capability to create other layers of function over that capability.
One feature absent from prior accounts of infrastructure is recognition of the moral responsibilities that grow along with infrastructure. People who build and maintain technical systems do not necessarily envision the level of responsibility that might follow from other people coming to depend on the system. But as a technical system becomes embedded in people's work and daily lives, and as other systems and associated practices are built over them, a generalized duty of care begins to build as the system becomes more infrastructural. A system builder may not have had any ambition to become so essential to others' welfare, but once people come to depend on a system, responsibility for beneficence begins to attach to everyone who has a hand in the system.
For the study of how the public comes to depend on scientific expertise, much can be learned from infrastructure studies. The first and most important lesson is that, pervasively in contemporary human society, systems and associated practices are built over other systems and their associated practices, without necessarily any explicit attention to the terms under which this occurs. Explicit agreements about who is responsible for what tend to emerge late in the process of infrastructuring. First comes dependency of one system on another, then comes recognition that one system is vulnerable to failure in the other, and only then comes a desire for assurances that the embedded system will not be allowed to fail.
A second lesson is that social responsibility and duty of care are not elements of a job description, but obligations that follow automatically with how much consequence one person's actions may have for another's well-being. Building a bridge connected to a highway obligates someone (a government, usually) to see to the continued safety of the structure.
A third lesson is that infrastructuring occurs when trust is invested in a technical system, including in a system that is not (at first) worthy of trust. We put trust in physical infrastructures and build other technical systems over them even though we know that the infrastructure may fail. Often, the fact that other technical systems have been layered over a prospective infrastructure speeds the hardening of that system into something truly dependable-by raising the stakes for failure of the system. Now I believe we are prepared to test a conjecture: that many dilemmas of contemporary practice will benefit from thinking about how to make expert advice as infrastructural as possible-designing them for dependability and then just depending on them until they need our attention again. This will shift our focus from evaluating individual experts or individual contributions of expert advice toward actively designing devices that organize scientific and technical knowledge for use.
THE L'AQUILA EARTHQUAKE TRIAL
As a context for testing my conjecture I have chosen events around a criminal trial that has been in progress since September 2011-the trial of seven scientists for alleged negligence prior to the 2009 L'Aquila earthquake (see "Scientists in the Dock," 2011, for a good overview). If we wanted to choose one controversy as the focus of a cross-disciplinary multiperspectival study of expertise in public deliberation, we could hardly do better than the events surrounding the L'Aquila earthquake trial. This controversy demonstrates in the most tragic way what is at stake for both citizens and scientists when expertise is mismanaged. Depending on how we slice the events occurring before and after the earthquake, the case seems to fall right within the focal strength of any of several prominent lines of work. For pragmadialecticians, there are derailed strategic manoeuvres to be untangled; for social epistemologists, there are conflicting sources of expert advice to the citizenry and conflicting claims about the track records of expert methodologies; for Third Wave science studies, there are disputes over who should be participating in the decisions; for informal logicians, there is a trial involving heavily contested expert testimony. I will of course concentrate on what this case might teach us about design and infrastructuring-but by no means do I think that we can understand this complicated set of events without many other theoretical perspectives.
So to review the history, on April 6, 2009, a devastating earthquake killed 308 people in the Italian city of L'Aquila. For several months prior to the large quake, the area had been experiencing smaller tremors. A researcher at a nearby laboratory had predicted that a major quake would occur, based on unusual emissions of radon gas, and had been denounced by the local authorities. On March 31, 2009, civil authorities convened a panel of scientists in L'Aquila to evaluate the level of risk. Discussion at that meeting focused on the impossibility of accurately predicting when earthquakes will occur. Nevertheless, just one week before the quake, public officials reassured the people in the region that there was no special danger despite the ongoing swarm of smaller quakes. One official stated that, in fact, the swarm of smaller quakes was actually a good sign. He claimed to have gotten this opinion from "the experts." Citizens who had been sleeping out of doors returned to their homes, and many died a week later as a result of that decision.
A little over a year after the quake, Italian prosecutors brought criminal charges of manslaughter against seven scientists (the meeting convenor Bernardo de Bernardinis and six experts in seismology), provoking a worldwide outcry by other scientists (Hall, 2011) . The trial has been underway since September 2011, and the seven defendants made their first statements just two days before our conference opened.
Let us return to five prototype problems I mentioned earlier. In many controversies, all of these prototypes appear in a tangle, and this is especially noticeable in the events surrounding the L'Aquila earthquake. Prototype 1. Individual citizens were alarmed by the swarm of small tremors and were highly motivated to seek out expert advice on whether to sleep outdoors. Two very different opinions were available to them: at one extreme, the highly alarmist opinion of Giampaolo Giuliani, who claimed to be able to predict that a large quake was imminent; and at the other extreme, the highly reassuring opinion of Bernardo de Bernardinis, who claimed that the small tremors were actually a favorable indication that there would be no large quake in the near future. Here citizens were forced to actually choose between sources claiming expertise. Neither, however, was himself a seismologist. Giuliani based his claims on his own observations, using a nonstandard method for prediction. De Bernardinis based his claims (so he said) on consultation with other scientists.
Prototypes 2 and 3. Active projection of expertise was at work as well, with Giuliani attempting to build his own credibility by explaining the nature of his experience and the novel basis of his prediction and other scientists attempting to discredit him. Journalists of course played their usual role, seeking out commentators on Giuliani's predictions, both before and after the deadly quake.
Prototype 4. A now infamous hearing of the Major Risks Commission brought together six highly qualified experts for the specific purpose of determining whether the series of smaller quakes indicated elevated risk for L'Aquila and the surrounding region. The convening of an expert panel is the sort of thing that commonly happens when an expert community has not reached consensus on an issue and when much is at stake. There is now evidence (from a recorded telephone conversation) that the expert panel was convened for the specific purpose of squelching the alarmist message of Giampaolo Giuliani (Cartlidge, 2012; , and that is in fact what happened as a result. Here we see the deep need for looking beyond questions of who may participate as an expert. There is no doubt whatsoever 12 that the six earthquake scientists brought together at L'Aquila "knew what they were talking about," but somehow they seem not to have known what to say to the people of L'Aquila before, during, or after the meeting (Hall, 2011) .
Prototype 5. The scientists assembled at L'Aquila were not random choices from the expert community but members of the Major Risks Commission, an institutionalized component of the national public safety bureaucracy. They were also members of global research communities whose research topics and methods carry institutional history of all kinds, ranging from path-dependent scientific modeling techniques to the highly contingent professional values that defend boundaries between scientific knowledge and the sociopolitical uses of that knowledge. Public officials had a legitimate institutional interest in suppressing Giuliani's message if they believed it to be scientifically invalid; allowing his alarmist message to be spread without countering it risked losing the public's confidence in the public agencies responsible for risk information.
Later it may be possible to do much more with this tragic and complicated case, but a few observations are possible even now.
First, in circumstances like this, citizens cannot take individual responsibility for evaluating competing expert claims. They must delegate this work. There was a formally composed body whose remit was to do this work. The meeting convened to do this work had an appropriate and usually reliable design: a consultation with a panel of the most highly qualified scientists available. Other experts reviewing the transcript of the meeting have affirmed the scientific correctness of statements made by the participants, especially on the impossibility of accurately forecasting earthquakes. However, this normally reliable device was invoked not by mutual agreement among participants, but as a coercive move by government officials who already knew what answer they hoped to get from the inquiry and who had also already tried other methods of repressing Giuliani's alarmist message. The meeting lasted less than an hour.
Significantly, what came out of the meeting was a statement to the press by a nonspecialist rather than a formal statement authored by the specialists (Nosengo, 2010) . Whenever one technical system must interact with another, the interface becomes important. There were opportunities for compromise and distortion at multiple points in the process of consulting the scientists about the danger of a major earthquake, and this was most evident in the interface between the panel of earthquake scientists and the press. Second, an integral part of the controversy has been who should and who should not be contributing to decision making in virtue of their expertise, but in addition to the groundlevel dispute over participants' legitimacy, there are undisputed experts involving themselves on issues beyond their expertise.
Consider Giampaolo Giuliani first. He is not a seismologist, but he is a working scientist who holds a patent on a device for measuring radon emissions and had been working on the use of his predictive technique for some time. Authorities attempted to suppress his contributions (Sample, 2009 ), referring to him as a scaremonger and even (indirectly) as an imbecile (Cartlidge, 2012) . However, the idea of predicting earthquakes from gas emissions is not in itself implausible, and Giuliani believed that his own investigations were validating his methods. One might say that Giuliani is in the "should not contribute" category, because his ideas had been considered and rejected by the relevant experts, specifically by those who later played a part in the L'Aquila meeting of the Major Risks Commission (Dollar, 2010) . But remember that Giuliani was working on a new method based on this idea. A person's 13 participation in decision making cannot be dependent on employment of techniques that are already blackboxed; blackboxing is something that occurs after multiple successful uses of a technique, not something achieved in advance of successful use.
Next consider Bernardo de Bernardinis. He also is a scientist but not an expert in earthquakes. He convened the March 31 hearing, and he gave statements to the press on behalf of the Commission. The gist of his statement was that the swarm of small tremors did not indicate any elevated risk of a large quake, and that in fact the swarm of small tremors was a favorable sign. A transcript of the hearing was published in an Italian magazine, and most capable readers find that the co-defendant scientists were scientifically correct in their discussion, saying nothing that would have justified de Bernardinis in this conclusion (Jordan, 2011; Nosengo, 2010) . Based on a recorded telephone message disclosed during the trial, it appears that de Bernardinis was instructed to convene the hearing with the specific purpose of finding a basis for reassuring the citizens (Nosengo & Nature News Blog, 2012) , and he may well have felt that his idea was confirmed by the specialists' review of the situation. His six colleagues undoubtedly knew that what de Bernardinis said was false and dangerous; that is, they undoubtedly knew that people should remain vigilant. But they did not contradict de Bernardinis, then or later. The members of the Major Risks Commission definitely belong in the "should contribute" category, but what now becomes apparent is that what people should contribute is more important than which people should contribute.
I will not discuss the contributions of the other six defendants in the trial. Each of them made their first appearance in court as I prepared these remarks. But let us consider, finally, the participation of the broader scientific community, especially after the announcement that the seven commission members would be indicted and tried for manslaughter. About the immediate protest from within the scientific community, it should be noted that geophysicists and other scientists are no better positioned than any other citizen to judge charges of negligent conduct, if these are not based on the quality of the science but on the performance of a public duty. Among the range of possible bases for a charge of negligence would be focusing on issues peripheral to the assessment of risk, collaborating in a sham proceeding with a predetermined outcome, allowing a spokesperson to misrepresent the scientific conclusions, or simply failing to anticipate public response to an overly reassuring message. Any of these, if they occurred, would fail ethical standards such as those suggested by Hardwig (1994) , but whether these failures occurred, and whether their occurrence constitutes criminal conduct, is clearly not a scientific question that can be decided by other scientists.
The third and most important element of this case is what it reveals about the importance of accountability for anything the public is expected to treat as infrastructure. From the perspective of infrastructure theory, earthquake measurement and monitoring make up an infrastructure-in-waiting. These activities are already highly standardized, and they are invisible to the public except as reports of how powerful a given tremor was. But these capabilities have not yet achieved infrastructure status because people have not quite figured out what to do with them. A technical system becomes infrastructural when practices are built on top of it, and what can be built on top of earthquake science is still a source of tension between citizens and scientists. Despite scientists' widespread agreement that earthquakes cannot be accurately predicted, citizens want and expect predictions of when and where earthquakes will occur. This may never be successful, but it is certainly the case that people will continue searching for ways to predict earthquakes. Scientists themselves envision a 14 different infrastructural use of earthquake science: as a justification for construction standards that make earthquakes survivable. Unfortunately, public officials and citizens alike are far more interested in earthquake warnings than in long-term investment in safer buildings, a point that some scientists have made about L'Aquila (Hall, 2011 ; "Science in the Dock," 2011).
Before this or any other variety of expertise can become infrastructural, someone must accept the duty of care that comes from building something that others build over. On this point, I want to examine two formal statements issued by scientific organizations, one issued by the American Geophysical Union and another written by Alan Leshner on behalf of the American Association for the Advancement of Science. These statements trouble me, because they not only fail to acknowledge the expert community's duty of care but actively reject it for scientists engaged in important public decisions. Specifically the two statements suggest that scientists may refuse to share their expertise unless they themselves are held harmless:
The criminal charges against these scientists and officials are unfounded. Despite decades of scientific research in Italy and in the rest of the world, it is not yet possible to accurately and consistently predict the timing, location, and magnitude of earthquakes before they occur. It is thus incorrect to assume that the L'Aquila earthquake should have been predicted. The charges may also harm international efforts to understand natural disasters and mitigate associated risk, because risk of litigation will discourage scientists and officials from advising their government or even working in the field of seismology and seismic risk assessment. (Anonymous, 2010, italics mine) Years of research, much of it conducted by distinguished seismologists in your own country, have demonstrated that there is no accepted scientific method for earthquake prediction that can be reliably used to warn citizens of an impending disaster. To expect more of science at this time is unreasonable. It is manifestly unfair for scientists to be criminally charged for failing to act on information that the international scientific community would consider inadequate for issuing a warning. Moreover, we worry that subjecting scientists to criminal charges for adhering to accepted scientific practices may have a chilling effect on researchers, thereby impeding the free exchange of ideas necessary for progress in science and discouraging them from participation in matters of great public importance. (Leshner, 2010, italics mine) At issue is whether de Bernardinis and the six earthquake scientists exercised the due diligence demanded by the situation. Until the trial is concluded, no one is really in a very good position to say whether anyone failed in their duty of care for the citizenry. However, for citizens to depend on expert communities in decision making, representatives of those expert communities must be accountable for performance failures, just as any infrastructural system includes accountability for individuals who build and operate the infrastructure. The Major Risks Commission clearly had a duty of care with respect to the citizens of L'Aquila, and the criminal trial is about whether this duty was shirked when scientific opinion about the predictability of earthquakes was invoked as support for public misinformation-the reassuring official statement that the small tremors were a favorable sign rather than a cause for continued vigilance. As Hardwig (1994) observed, the public depends on experts to blow the whistle in cases like this one.
My point here agrees with Douglas (2003) , who argues that scientific practice is subject to the same moral responsibilities as apply to any other social action: the responsibility to consider and weigh risk associated with one's own choices, and especially with the unintended consequences of one's own choices. Scientists who take actions without thinking through potential consequences may create harm through negligence, regardless of whatever scientific purpose may be served by the action. While Douglas's argument is focused on choice of scientific programs rather than on advice-giving, her position that scientists must accept that there can be negligence in their performance as scientists is potentially relevant to this case.
CONCLUSION
How scholars deal with the theoretical problems of understanding expertise will naturally affect (and be affected by) how the public deals with the practical problems of evaluating expert opinion. Especially throughout the later half of the 20 th Century, citizen groups and government agencies have been tinkering with designs for tapping into our vast stores of expertise. But the design process has been guided by trial-and-error more than by theory. What might a well-developed argumentation design theory offer?
First let me clarify what I mean by design theory. Whatever its specific content, the theory should be capable of supporting design, including proposals for novel designs. Reasoning from analogy with other design enterprises, we should expect that each unique controversy may have unique design requirements-as do unique building sites. Design disciplines have general principles and models of how these principles apply in particular settings, but they assume that any new situation will require its own design based on application of the principles and inspired by the successful models of the past. The characteristics of the controversy should shape the design of a deliberation process the way a building site shapes the design of the structure. The role of theory is to suggest design hypotheses that get implemented as actual designs for the conduct of argumentation.
Argumentation design theory will likely draw content from many sources, the most obvious of which are normative theories of argumentation (van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Jackson, & Jacobs, 1993) . I have suggested in these remarks that certain design theory problems may also benefit from what we know about other layered technical systems-that is, from what we know about infrastructure. There is infrastructural potential in society's scientific and technical capacity, but infrastructure isn't infrastructure until its operation can be taken for granted and other activities can be confidently built over it. Good designs for exploitation of technical expertise must let the details of expert judgment sink into invisibility as far as the ordinary citizen is concerned, but both the basis for expert judgment and its social consequences must become a matter of great care for those who work inside the technical system. In other words, instead of focusing circumstantially on whether and when it is reasonable to place confidence in technical experts, argumentation design theory focuses on how to design trustworthiness into relationships between technical experts and citizens.
How, exactly, does trustworthiness get designed into a system? Turning again to comparison with infrastructural systems, a key feature is an acknowledged duty of care. People in the infrastructure business have an inescapable duty of care for those who depend on them. Scientific fields must embrace this duty of care, and while it is possible that what is happening in L'Aquila will discourage scientists from giving advice, it is also possible that individual scientists who engage with public controversy will grow accustomed to accepting the same kinds of personal risk that public officials do.
Our ability to rationally manage our dependence on technical expertise is vulnerable in many ways, but among these, one of the most serious vulnerabilities is the notion that experts themselves should have no accountability for the foreseeable consequences of how they deploy their expertise. But accountability, like other aspects of a sociotechnical system, must be designed with care to achieve intended effects (trust) without unwanted effects (suppression of experts' participation in practical affairs). Accountability may take much less drastic forms than criminal prosecution, and it can incorporate protection for those acting in good faith. The worldwide scientific community has been shocked by the criminal prosecution of these Italian scientists. But this extreme method of calling the experts to account was only attractive because of the absence of any well-proportioned method of doing so.
From an infrastructure theory perspective, the task we face is not deciding whether to trust experts or which experts to trust, but to recognize that expertise is a societal investment that can be shaped for greater trustworthiness. Professional training can be infused with ethical principles (Hardwig, 1994) and with analytic frameworks for considering broader social impacts (Cohen, 2012) . Accountability structures can be devised for more institutionalized forms of expert participation. Procedural checks and balances can be incorporated to control for known sources of bias. And other strategies are of course possible. Since we must depend on experts, we must make it as safe as possible to do so.
